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Clear, student-friendly notes on Gilbert Harman’s “What Is Moral Relativism?”—covering the three forms (normative, moral-judgment, meta-ethical), classic objections (genuine disagreement, law of non-c...
Harman argues that for a non-relativistic judgment to be considered correct, the corresponding relativistic judgment must be true in relation to the morality of the speaker.
Harman suggests that conflicting non-relativistic judgments may not lead to conflicting relativistic judgments, even if both are true.
Normative Moral Relativism posits that different individuals can be subject to different ultimate moral requirements, meaning that two people can have different moral demands based on their situations.
1) Person A is subject to moral demand D, 2) Person B is not subject to D, 3) Person B is subject to some other moral demands, and 4) There is no common demand D' that accounts for the differences in moral requirements between A and B.
Moral Judgment Relativism asserts that all moral judgments implicitly reference the speaker, another person, a group, or a set of moral standards, indicating that moral judgments are not universally applicable.
Meta-Ethical Relativism allows for conflicting moral judgments about a particular case to be both fully correct, suggesting that moral truths can vary based on different perspectives.
Harman indicates that one can accept one form of moral relativism while rejecting the others, meaning that the acceptance of one thesis does not necessitate the acceptance of the others.
Harman emphasizes that the plausibility of assumptions regarding moral judgments depends on what is considered good reasoning, questioning whether rationality is purely procedural or if it allows for substantive moral differences.
Harman's version of normative moral relativism entails moral judgment relativism for relativists, as their moral judgments are made in relation to a morality they accept, which they assume is shared with their audience.
Harman argues that his version of normative moral relativism also entails meta-ethical relativism regarding judgments made by non-relativists, as relativists will consider non-relativist moral judgments as correct under certain conditions.
Harman cites emotivism, existentialism, and relativistic ideal observer theory as examples of positions that may accept or reject various forms of moral relativism.
A common objection is that there must be an explanation for why one person is subject to a moral demand while another is not, suggesting that such differences cannot be arbitrary.
Harman acknowledges the need for a principle that explains the differences in moral demands between individuals, indicating that moral relativism must be grounded in non-arbitrary reasoning.
The speaker's morality is central to moral judgments, as judgments are often made in relation to the moral standards accepted by the speaker and their intended audience.
Moral relativism can be beneficial by promoting tolerance and understanding of diverse moral perspectives, but it can also be problematic by potentially undermining the universality of moral truths and leading to moral nihilism.
Harman's view implies that moral discourse must consider the relativistic nature of judgments, recognizing that disagreements may stem from differing moral frameworks rather than absolute moral failures.
Harman's perspective challenges traditional moral absolutism by asserting that moral truths are not fixed and can vary based on individual circumstances and perspectives, thus questioning the idea of universal moral laws.
The audience plays a crucial role in moral judgments, as relativists assume that the audience shares the same moral framework, which influences how judgments are made and interpreted.
Harman's view suggests that moral progress can be understood through the lens of relativism, where shifts in moral standards reflect changes in societal values rather than a movement towards an absolute moral truth.
Relativists face challenges in defending their position against accusations of moral inconsistency, the potential for moral nihilism, and the difficulty of establishing a coherent framework for resolving moral disagreements.
Harman's approach emphasizes the contextual nature of moral judgments and the importance of individual perspectives, contrasting with more rigid frameworks that advocate for absolute moral truths.